Small/Medium Business and Security/Privacy exploration

In this blog entry I want to explore the effects and the threats surrounding the small business realm and how it is effected by concerns of security and of course indirectly privacy.

But first some numbers.

1) Targeted attacks destined for Small  Business (1 to 250 (employees) accounted for 31 percent of all attacks, compared with 18 percent in 2011, an increase of 13 percent [1]

2) According to the National Federation of Independent Businesses, as many as 30% of an average company's employees do steal, and another 60% will steal if given a motive and opportunity.[2]

3) Almost three-quarters (72%) of data breaches investigated by Verizon Communications’ forensic analysis unit were focused on companies with less than 100 employees.[3]

And the list goes on. But I hope you get the idea.

In fact, depending on the source of data, there is no difference between the security issues of large organizations and small & medium business (SMB) (under 1000 employees).

Both types of businesses rely on computerize ‘everything’, to support their ongoing commercial and not for profit endeavors, never mind using social media for commercial marketing etc.. Both (large and SMB), for the most part, have web sites, use email, store information within databases containing commercial/proprietary information, financial positions (bookkeeping) etc. The employees also have access to various types of data (including those mentioned above), and can carry around that information on smartphones (bring your own device (BYOD)), etc.  Yet, except for some superficial attempt to secure the endeavor’s information, most SMB are vulnerable to threats like those that are mentioned above. The reason is because not enough is done to protect that sensitive information.

Let’s just investigate some best practices for organizations today.

All organizations, whether big or small, should have a Disaster Recovery (DR)/Business Continuity Plan (BCP) to enable them to still function and continue to be in business if an issue presents itself. How many small businesses do have a fully tested, functional BCP? Yet a disaster does not care if the company in question has 100 employees or 5,000.

All organizations should have and enforce internet/email usage policies. This should reduce any blatant misuse and potentially harmful activities of employees (or at least enable employers to take action if need be).

And the list of items that need addressing goes on and on. Many large organizations have specialist(s) whose entire responsibilities are just to ensure the day-to-day operation of the business.

While all organizations have to address critical issues, SMB have a number of strong disadvantages. The obvious one that comes to mind is their lack of resources. Namely most small business cannot afford a full time security/privacy professional. If money is not the issue (ever heard of a company where it wasn’t?) then a lack of expertise would be another major factor (and handicap). It takes time and experience to protect and recover from security concerns. And the basic human thought, ‘it will never happen to us, is something all personnel have to deal with.

So let’s take look at an realistic example of what can  happen to a $5,000,000 dollar a year SMB business.

11)    They have a major system failure and their systems were completely down for 4 days, and only partially in order for another six days. Total loss approx. $175,000

22) Cost to hire professionals to bring their system back on line $12,000

33)  Lost of a number important documents (payroll information, orders, A/R etc) that would be difficult to recreate. Cost unknown.

Total cost $187,000 +

Now lets take a look on the cost of setting up a relatively simple BCP/DR Etc

11)   Set up a working and tested DR/backup plan as part of a BCP $10,000

22)   Set up a commercial firewall, configured to help enforce the companies policies $10,000

33) Set up endpoint security (Anti-malware, Data Loss Prevention etc.) $5,000

44) Administration, training $5,000

Total cost $30,000

For a savings of  about $157,000 and with a big reduction of risk to the organization it then becomes obvious which of the two is the better option.

You can see by the numbers, the company in question would agree, it was a costly oversight not to do the due diligence, to say the least.

So we have all these organizations that are liable to have security/compliance/privacy etc issues, yet money is a huge concern. So what can be done?

There are a number of independent consultants whose specialty is to work with SMB. These consultants can plan and implement the best practices that are needed for an organization. They bring expertise, certifications, etc. that a small organization could ill afford to develop in-house due to the costs involved. For most SMB, once a comprehensive plan is developed and deployed, only a small additional cost would be needed moving forward to make sure everything is tested/working (maintenance/review changes etc) on an ongoing bases .

However, I would be remiss if I did not highlight the importance of finding a competent resource. There are a lot of consultants that have hung their shingle out to find business. So due diligence is in order. Ask for references, preferably with companies of a similar nature. Ask for any professional certifications that are concerned with this domain/realm. Ask for an estimate for the work needed. Get a Statement of Work (SOW) which should also include an established procedure for cost escalation and/or additional work requests. In other words try to make sure you are getting value for your money.

At then end it comes down to that, in our electronic world we work/live in, cutting corners will end up biting you on your bottom line. Ignoring the issues does not make it go away. But there is a reasonable way of mitigating those very real risks.

As the saying goes, ‘an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure’, and the sooner the better.

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[1] http://www.symantec.com/about/news/release/article.jsp?prid=20130415_01

[2] www.nfib.com/business-resources/business-resources-item?cmsid=29624

[3] http://www.verizonenterprise.com/DBIR/2013/

Security/Privacy Personnel, should they be the same?

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I have been on the peripheral of the discussion about Privacy and Security for awhile. The debate is concerning how Privacy personnel are not familiar with IT security process. And I believe its time to take the bull by the tail and face the situation, so to speak.

My thesis is that there needs to be a concerted effort to develop  a liaison group involving people that feel comfortable in both areas of Privacy and IT Security. These people should understand how data is used within the IT, and what expectations Privacy places on the organization.

SO let’s explore

In the vast majority of enterprises, (those that have a IT department and also are concerned by privacy, as all companies should be) there are Privacy officers that deal solely in the Privacy realm (Privacy policy, governance etc) and the IT personnel whose function it  is to enhance/maintain/deploy process to Secure the network assets from the 'bad guy'

But before we delve into this much further, let’s explore some of the foundations of these two organizations.

Privacy requirements come from various requirements, regulations, laws. They are formulated/created, either by gov't or professional organizations. Examples include: the PCI DSS, SOX, GLBA, PIPEDA,  EU Directive, to name but a few.

These regulations/laws, for the most part are drafted by lawyers, civil servants, professional committees. I transgress with a quick joke. What is a camel? A horse designed by a committee.
The point is that, as written, these regulations are not written for the 'common man'.  They deal with the legal aspects of privacy and as such, written in 'legalize'. So to be able to interpret them, create processes to address them, and ensure compliance with the same, it requires individuals that can understand those same rules. That is, one with expertise in the legal and/or regulator profession.

Security comes from the technical world, the idea of what kind of security appliances are needed to monitor/secure the systems/network/infrastructure that are in place within the organization. The understanding of networking protocols, threats and vulnerabilities etc. needs someone who understands the technical complicated the Security realm

So far so good.

We also understand that to have Privacy, one must have Security, or otherwise the organization’s public reputation, never mind its ability to function under gov't rules  and industry regulation oversight may be in jeopardy. (IE data breaches etc).

However, how many Privacy officers know anything about a 'DMZ' or DLP appliance (to name but two Technical Security phases/gobbledygook). That is the Security guy’s responsibility, right?

How many security personnel understand the ramifications of a stolen laptop with an encrypted disk, with PII from Customers in the US, or if the PII is from those customers that are located within the EU. That is the privacy department issue?

So that is the dilemma. Each department’s needs to 'use' the other’s expertise. But is there is no common language? One group doesn't know what it does not know and the other assumes that everything is addressed. This scenario is a problem waiting to happen.

So let’s take an example. But please note that the following example is only being used to highlight my point. It is an over simplification of the issues.

A new network is being developed to support an application that is being rolled out shortly. This application contains PII/PHI information. In one of the meetings the CPO makes it clear that this type of information needs to be protected/secured.  The Security guys go to the back room and incant some magic spells over a rack of computers/servers (sorry I could not help myself) and POOF, out comes a Security policy/procedure etc. plan for the roll out.

The plan contains the proper role based security rules(RBAC), checks, logs etc. The Security guys go out for a drink to celebrate the culmination of designing a 'fool proof' Security envelope (as  if there was such a thing).

The Privacy person figures out that the proposed process meets the needs and regulations and goes home with a smile on his/her face. The only people who are authorized to see the information will have the ability to view the PII/PHI info.

However, did anyone look at how support is going to done for this application? The Privacy professional is not a techie and does not know what the 'normal' infrastructure for support/maintenance development for an application is. And why should he/she? Right?


WRONG

The CPO has no idea that during the development and support phases of the project, that copies of the real data may be created to provide a more realistic test bed  for QA/ regression testing.(see my previous blog entry for a  further discussion concerning this issue).

Did anyone look at the possibility that there may be data leakage within the test/regression system? (PII info that can be emailed in the clear from a developer workstation)?  Did the person responsible for Privacy understand the need for a possible Security hardware deployment within the test environment to prevent data leakage. And where should that hardware be deployed?  How do third parties access the data for testing? Should they be able to see the test (or Production data)? Should this be considered with a BCP (business contingency planning) document?

The people responsible for Security understand the basic Security 'triad' (CIA. Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability) and have created a process that addresses these requirements. In this case the Security personnel, and may be the network administrator, have designed a comprehensive plan to secure the network where the new application will live on.

But what do they understand about issues like: if a disk drive goes missing, even if it is encrypted, they may still need to notify gov't authorities (EU directive)? And this must be detailed in any contingency planning.

Do they know that they need to talk to the Privacy department to look at how test data is used and abused?

The above mentioned questions are rather over simplified. And of course during the normal working day, the Security department and the Privacy department would talk to each other. BUT

The old adage is very relevant here. 'I don't know what I don't know' or in the case of the Security personnel they don’t know enough of the Privacy realm to make sure everything is addressed. And the Privacy officer does not know how the data is used, to the point that she/he would not know to look into areas that are not obvious IE Test Bed, Third party issues etc..

So what is the answer? Cross train personnel. (Easier said then done).

Have the security department take a course like the CIPP, offered by the International Association of Privacy Professionals. This will allow for the same individuals some insight into the issues pertaining to privacy.
 
Have the Privacy personnel take a certification course like the SECURITY+ offered by CompTIA. However this may be more problematic because there is an assumption that the person taking this course (or one that is similar) has some basic knowledge in networking and IT in general.

Failing that, Have the people in the CPO office at least try to get the basis of Security down, so the next time the two groups meet they can at least talk a common language. And this would help in reducing the chance of something being missed, and projects coming in on time.

Testing, in the black box (ATV), Security & Privacy

How Automate Testing Vehicles (ATV) should include Pentesting.

Why should privacy officers get involved in development, regression testing process?

Why does IT need to improve their testing strategies?

Pitfalls in Testing, Security/Privacy concerns is what drives people to have nightmares. Privacy officers need to have a better understanding of the environment they work in. The IT people need to embrace the notion that Privacy/Security starts from the beginning. So in that way the chances of being on a front page of a newspaper because of a breach and/or a failure will be minimized. NO ONE wants to phone the CIO about a problem like this. It is a team effort.

I do have to warn you, the reader, that some of the material may be a  little IT oriented. But in an organization where one needs to satisfy a number of different objectives, I would suggest at least a basic knowledge of the IT process is needed. And that the IT personnel need to understand the present compliance/regulator landscape.

Some definitions are warranted before I begin.

ATV or Automated Testing Vehicle. What is it? Why do I care? And is it a 'best practice'? (one of the most over used phrase at present).

The idea is fairly simple. Having a set of scripts (automated) that can be run to test the system in question. The objective is to test the system before any changes are implemented. The process should set up  the files that will be used for testing(see one of my previous blog posts concerning using data for testing),  then run the test scripts, and afterwards run the comparison reports and highlight items of concern from the test just executed. All this is done in an automated fashion. Rather simple concept, but one that can be 'processes' changing in a good way.

Well there is more to this. But let me define another term or two first.

IT systems that are down cost money in lost revenue, and good will to the enterprise.  As an example, in 2012 Google had an outage.
Google June 2012 down for 10 min.

The ball park figure cost that Google suffered was calculated at about $750,000. And that was for 10 minutes.  Now I am not suggesting all downtime costs are that much. It depends on the circumstances, but I am sure no one would like to find out for their own companies.

Another good example of the costs is sited at costs of web down time per industry

This site allows you to calculate the cost of a web site being down per industry/application. Its an eye opener to say the least.

In another 'word', downtime is BAD/EXPENSIVE *Yea  I know that is two words*. But joking aside we need to reduce unavailability as much as possible.

PenTesting. Wikipedia link  The Information Systems Audit and Control Association(ISACA) defines Penetration Testing as  "A test of the effectiveness of security defences through mimicking the actions of real-life attackers."

(For the reader who is more concerned with Privacy/Security, please read on)

So now let's proceed. When an application change happens IT personnel (or a designated organization) tests the changes (IE regression testing). They test the change to see if it works. Now depending on the process that is followed, a user may also test/approve the same series of changes to the application for user approval. Fine, right? Do you notice something missing in the above? In fact, there is more then one item here that needs to be defined/explored.

For many organizations testing to maintain the basic functions within an application does happen in a haphazardly way.  Sure the change is tested and to get to the enhancements, some basic functions are tested as well, But, based on my anecdotal experiences, on many occasions, the entire core functions of the changed application are not testing on a consistent bases.  A test of the all the basic core functions should also be completely tested whenever there is a change.

As an example, if the application in question is some public facing web application (a web store as an example), basic function testing should also be done. Test for example, the ability to add/change a Credit card information and make sure that the update still works. Test adding an item to the shopping cart etc.

So if the new function within the application fails, you have verified that the basic core functions, the one you need to keep the doors open, will still operate.

Imagine if an error occurs at your bank, yet the basic functions were tested successfully with the 'improved mobile bank portal' (the change that will be implemented).  Then logic would dictate that the basic functions should still work (you can still pay bills) even if the enhancement of the bank's mobile app does not. Corrections can be retested and implemented with minimal cost/embarrassment to the organization.

I am therefore advocating that there should be standard testing scripts that confirm, even with the changes that are going to be implemented,  that ALL the core functions still are accessible.

So to implement a process like this, you first need to map out the basic functions that you can not live without. Once that is done and scripts are created, an automated process should be created. When ready, a series of script can be executed with little human intervention. (less change for human error). The 'Best Practice' (there is that phase again) would be something along the lines of submitting the scripts and going home. When you get into the office the following day the results are ready for analysis/correction etc.

This should ensure that at even if the new change fails. You, the customer, can still do business with the organization in question. This is what some people call a ATV (see above). This process can be called your insurance policy.

However, lets' takes this further. Why just test  the basic functionality of the application? Should we also test for Security/Privacy issues?  Should the company's Privacy/Security office ensure that this type of testing, verification is also included within an ATV and executed whenever anything changes?

Absolutely!

A process that includes PenTesting (see above) is something one should consider adding to the above mentioned ATV. With any change there is always a chance that a vulnerability is created that may not have been there before.

Any failure can by it's very nature, cause the potential to expose sensitive information. It can be business secrets, and/or Personnel Identifiable Information (PII) to name but two potential headaches.

There is software in the marketplace that has the capability to engage/test/analyze applications for vulnerabilities. Some of the software I have previously mentioned as well as others which are available with the capabilities needed.

So I suggest that one creates an ATV process that includes the basic functionality of the application/system in question as well as additional testing for security/privacy. All  this should be automated so that more extensive testing can be executed as well as reducing the chance for human error.

Privacy officers need to ensure that any changes that are implemented will not cause exposure that may be costly. IT people need to make sure that the basic systems functions still run, no matter what is changed.

Finally, while no one can claim in absolute terms that there will be no issues, following these basic concepts can help reduce the chance that the CIO needs to be called because of an issue.

Privacy for IT, Security for PO, Privacy by Design PdB.

So far I have tried to tackle how different professionals look at privacy differently and how stakeholders are an important piece of the pie

What I am going to try to address within this post is how technical ideas affect privacy and security, as well.

I will also attempt to provide some guidance concerning some of the issues I will discuss here.

Please  note, I have no relationships with any of the companies that I mention here, or any in any other posts that I have written. Also, it is up to the reader to do their own due diligence.

Now, the reader may have some level of knowledge of the 'tecky' stuff but I will try not to make any assumptions. What I want to do is to highlight some aspects, describe them for those who may not be as technically inclined, and provide some resources where more research can be done.

Some lay people use the words security and privacy interchangeable. While security is needed to maintain privacy, it can mean other things as well. For example, physical security of a public facing office (banks, insurance agents offices etc) is generally accepted that it need to be addressed,  to protect the employees (non privacy issue) and protect the companies customers from data breaches, which is a privacy concern.

What I am going to deal with here is security that is needed to protect Personal Identifiable Information (PII)

So lets get started.

Security

Hopefully, when a developer starts coding for a new application, or making enhancements to an existing application, he/she will know how to code to prevent security holes within the code. But as we all know, we are all human.

SO what can we do?

A new type of software is emerging that can help developers to highlight what they should be coding. This is in a form of questions/guidance that can be based on questions/queries from a knowledge base. The objective is to build into the design document (this is the document that concern how the programs work together and coded, given the requirements of the application being worked on). This would then place into the design document specifications of the required defences that need to be incorporated within the code.

The two software products that I am aware that falls within this category are:

1) SD Elements (http://www.sdelements.com)

2) Security Innovations (https://www.securityinnovation.com)

Both have there strength and weaknesses. They also tackle this aspect of security coding in a very different way.

As an analogy, let us use the example of your car (or your friends, car if you don't have one <S>), or boat, bike etc. Which is cheaper? Is it changing your oil every x KM/Miles, or waiting for the engine to seize when the oil can no longer do its job?

On average it costs about $4,000 to fix a vulnerability in an application (SD Elements). According to White Hat Security (https://www.whitehatsec.com/resource/stats.html) on average, there are 56 vulnerabilities per website (2012). So let's do some math, Shall we?

It will cost $4,000 times 56 on average to fix all the problems with security on a public facing websites, for a total of, and average of $224,000.

You can close your mouth now.

And to top it all off 85% of all websites White Hat tested had one vulnerability. And to make matters worse, it took, on average, 193 days from the date the issue was detected until it was resolved. Never mind that 61% of the White Hat tested websites that had vulnerabilities were never fixed in the first place.

In other words, the best practices, as well as the ROI,  demand that we need to try to nip this issue in the bud. It follows that company's policy should have security requirements and processes be part of the design phase of any project.

Privacy

At this point let me highlight a series of documents, white papers that have been produced by the Information & Privacy Commissioner of Ontario Canada. (IPCO) Dr Ann Cavoukian PH. D.

The premise advocated by the IPCO is that of Privacy by Design (PbD). It goes in to much more depth that is beyond the scope of this blog but I encourage you to head over there and explore.

There are two sides to the equation. Security for the professional IT people and Privacy for the legal 'minds'. How in essence they are complementary and how they must exists together.

As a note here, one of the white papers on the sir 'Privacy and Security by Design: A convergence of Paradigms' talks about what I am writing about here. It was released in Jan 2012.

I do have to make an admission to the reader. I started writing  these blogs, and this one in particular, before I had any notion of this white paper's existence. When i did discover the PbD white papers i realized the concepts, topics, and themes were similar to the issues I have explored in my blogs,

I will continue along this road next time. I will highlight examples of different forms of testing for security and ideas of privacy.

Stakeholder/Privacy/Security Oh My

 


To continue with the theme I presented last time in which I discussed the differences between privacy (first pillar) and security (second pillar), I want to add a third pillar, that of the stakeholder. 

It seems obvious that he/she should also be included in any discussion along these lines. And yet stakeholders can only add complexity to the equation.  But before I begin, here are a couple of notes. I received a number of comments concerning the previous post. Some people commented about the fact that any discussion should include other interested groups as well. And as you will see, that is exactly what I will be doing here.   Yet I would be remiss unless I addressed another issue that was also brought up. 

What I 'd like to do, and only you, the reader, will be able to determine if I am successful, is to highlight the 'human' factor in this equation. As we move more and more to depending on, exploring, and exploiting the technology we use/rely on, we have had to develop tools to manage and control the reliance on the same technology. We have tools to check the code for security holes. We have tools to make sure we develop compliance processes. We have tools to help the auditors to verify systems, etc. 

Yet the one aspect that is forgotten in this mix is the human factor. He/she is the coder, the report writer, the auditor who verifies the results. etc. No system is fool proof and no human is perfect, except you the reader.   So why bring this up? I do so because some of the comments I received include the following: 'a security/privacy system that is put in place will address the wide divide between humans and technology/compliance'.

In response to this I say that tools are important, but we must realize that the tools are not the entire solution to this quandary. We need to understand entire eco system so we can successfully address the issues of Security, Privacy, Regulation, and Compliance. That being both the technology we use, and the tools we use to control/enhance it. 

So let's begin My objective in the previous blog was to highlight some of the inherent issues that prevail within the privacy/security domain. Here I want to explore the added complexity by adding the involvement of the stakeholder to this process.  Let define some terms. A stakeholder is the 'outsider'. The person who ultimately gains from the process being discussed. For a lack of a better way of definition, the owner/holder of the data in question. This can be a VP of the product line, the director of the stores, the sales manager etc. He/she is the one who can say, without question, 'the buck stops here". 

Generally speaking he just wants good end results. Most stakeholders see the added cost of implementing a well defined privacy policy/practice in place as an overhead that needs to be controlled. 

They want to make sure their data is safe but ask them if they think the added cost of security systems in place is, for example, worthwhile to prevent internal development personnel from having access to the real data, they would balk. (Note this is a generic over simplified statement, but I use it to make a point). To address this issue I point to a number of organizations that rely on non disclosure agreements (NDA)  the only protection to address the above mentioned issue. This is 'cheap' to implement and easy to maintain. Yet I hope you, the reader, understands that this solution is like having your teenager promise they will clean up the room. A good idea but without any other incentive probably doomed to failure.

The problem here is that we all have different views on the same situation. We come with different experiences, responsibilities, education. While the stakeholder is ultimately the person responsible (For further info along these lines read about the SOX act that was passed in the US), she/he may not know how a truly good governance regulation compliance (GRC) process is created. And in fact he might not even know why the company needs one in the first place.

So taking the analogy I used in my previous post(how security personnel and privacy professionals look at a 'square' and see it differently), the stakeholder is the owner of the 'square'. He holds the square but has no idea how it is constructed but only knows how the square is used, IE. not how the WEB application works. Only that a customer can sign in and order the widget.  So what can we to do? The answer I suggest is fairly simple. Education. 

The privacy officer must educate the interested parties. These parties include the stakeholders, the IT personnel Given that there is a privacy officer already in place means that the first step has been taken. The people who work on security need to educate everyone on what needs to done and what it takes to get it done.

The security personnel need to interpret the requirements and educate the parties on how this is implemented. Why does it extend the software development cycle. So in other words by educating the parties they can justify the time and materials that will be needed to produce eco systems that achieve the goals set out by all the interested parties within a manageable framework.

So to help the reader, I am suggesting a couple of different resources that can be used to help. 

1) A short piece on how to explain HIPAA to the layman (Stakeholder). It also provides some additional reading that may be of interest.

http://www.ehow.com/info_7778811_laymans-guide-hipaa-compliance.html

2) A very interesting website that targets NON lawyers with information concerning privacy. There are a lot of very good additional links that can be of some help. Please note that this site deals mostly with US laws.

http://www.eprivacy.com/lectures/toc.html#toc

3) Another good resource for educational purpose is the Electronic Privacy Information Center website. Once again, mostly US information.

http://epic.org/privacy/

4) On the consumer side of the debate, a list of resources can be found at 

http://www.privacyrightsnow.com/affiliates.htm

5) And finally, two studies that come out yearly. 

       A) One is the Telus security group yearly that looks at the state of Canadian companies security. It has 5 recommendations as well as pointers on how to try to make security more prevalent in the workplace. Registration is required.

http://promo.telus.com/securitystudy/

        B) The other one is the Verizon security's 2013 Data Breach Investigation Report. This report is a yearly report that encompasses expertise and information from various international organizations responsible for the reporting and investigation of data breaches. If you do not look at any  other resources listed here, then this is the one to read.

http://www.verizonenterprise.com/DBIR/2013/insider/

Please note the opinion of the individual authors/websites are their own, and I do not advocate, agree or dis-agree with the opinion expressed.

And this is just a sample of various resources that are available to help with the issues described above. But ultimately it is up to the individual to make sure they adhere to the best practices within their industry and Country.

Till next time